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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMS CONTROL 
AND DISARMAMENT FOR EUROPE 
Johan Galtung 
Europe, and the entire Cold War System including not only the 
Soviet Union but also the Umted States, have undergone a dramatic 
period of accelerated history. Only future generations wil be in a 
position to appreciate fuly the sigmf1cance of a process affecting 
directly the lives of 275 milhon inhabitants m North America, 540 
milhon m Europe West and East, North and South, and Center 
and 290 million in the Soviet Union; al together well above 1.1 bilion 
human beings, close to one fifth of humamty. Obviously, there are also 
imphcat1ons for the rest of the world, but they are less direct and 
immediate The following is an effort to spell out the sigml!cance in 
ten pomts, with some sub points. 
I The Transformat10n of Confhct Formations 
Two major scourges of humankind are gone from Europe, and 
probably 1rrevers1bly so, m a process that started with the conclusion of 
the Final Act of Helsmki in 1975, and culminated fal 1989. The first 1s 
the totalitarian stalmism of the Soviet Unrnn, mcluding the continuation 
and expansion of Russian imperialism within and outside the Soviet 
Union. The second is the genocidal Nucleansm of superpowers and 
alliances planning for a credible and winnable nuclear war With these 
two mutually remforcmg syndromes gone, the Cold War 1s over. There 
are good reasons to celebrate. 
However, four new conflict formations are now taking shape; al of 
them complex and demanding our most creative attention. 
First, the rapid disintegration of pax sovietica, a peace keeping 
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system under Moscow m1lttary control, which may or may not coincide 
with political disintegration of the Soviet Union. So far there has been 
open fighting between Azerbaijnis and Armemans, and between 
Hunganans and Romanians. Disintegration of pax americana followed 
by, say, lighting between Greeks and Turks has not (yet) taken place. 
There is an asymmetry in the process 
Second, the rapid transformation of some East European economies 
from centrally planned socialtsm to penpheral cap1taltsm with such 
Thlfd World characteristics as vertical mternational division of labor, 
asymmetric investment, tight elite cooperation and increasing mequahty 
and unemployment, even misery at the bottom of society. Central 
planning with immobilization of people and inabihty to deliver goods 
and sefV!ces is gone for now. But the problems of cap1tahsm are the 
same as before, with impressive center growth at the expense of 
periphery depression and misery. 
Thtrd, the rapid umfication process for two parts of pre war 
Germany, BRD and DDR, posing the question of what wdl happen to 
the other three parts; now Pohsh and Soviet temtones, and Austna 
Das Dritte Reich occupied 17 countries in Europe and caused the 
death of 26 million m the Soviet Union alone. The way unification 1s 
brought about by the 2+4(+1?) formula looks hkes Versailles in 
reverse. Are demands for pohsh apologies, leaving the eastern border 
ambiguous, indicative of Das Vierte Reich? 
Fourth, the rapid transformation of the European Community to a 
European Union, with not only cultural and economic, but also pohtical 
and m1htary integration, using the West European Union"'. With the 
unification of Germany 340 of 540 million Europeans, or 63% , wil live 
in the present EC member states. 
In short, we are w1tnessmg two conflict transformations: from a 
bipolar Europe with two alliances confronting each other to a unipolar 
Europe with the hegemomcal center in Western Europe commanding 
tremendous military and economic resources; and from military to 
economic resources as the leading factor. Integration m the West, 
except for German unification, is nothmg new m post-War history. It 1s 
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the dtsmtegration in the East that brmgs about the steepest West-East 
gradient in European history. Along this gradient al kmds of power are 
bound to flow, sooner or later. 
Deploring this, warning of the consequences, implies no nostalgia for 
stalinist pax sovietica, nor for Cold War nuclear confrontation with a 
non zero probability of a hot nuclear war. Although there are stil 
important military residues remammg from the Cold War, the hard core 
of the conflict formation, the bone of contention, disappeared when the 
fate of Eastern Europe was decided m Moscow’s disfavor Not only the 
population of the former Cald War System but also peoples in the 
Third world - who wil no longer have the Cold War acted out hot, by 
proxies can feel relieved. 
The Europe taking shape bears strong resemblance to Europe one 
century ago; but with power and integration more discrepant. 
Consequently, security has to be redefined, rethought, re searched 
I The Transformation m the East 
In this process the Soviet Umon and East Europe have: 
a: destalinized politicaly, working at it economically; 
b changed mditary doctrine, toward defensive/ sufficient/ non-
provocal!ve defense, more deeds now have to follow the words; 
c: proposed total withdrawal of nuclear weapons, of Soviet troops by 
1995 96 and al foreign bases by the year 2000; 
d: argued for the transformation of NA TO and WTO from mditary 
political to political alhances, 
e: put forward imaginative proposals for a Common European Home 
based on the equality of al participating countries. 
Much of this makes virtue of dire necessity, for economic and 
poht1cal change. But the trust toward a New European Peace Order is 
clear. And the new vtrtue ts preferable to the old vices. 
I The N on-Transformatrnn m the West 
In the same process the United States and Western Europe have 
a. declared their own system victorious with no self cril!cism of the 
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dark side of nuclear terror balance and capitalist economies; 
b: kept a highly offensive military doctrine, entering the discourse of 
defensive defense only m a CFE context; 
c: argued short range nuclear arms increases and for keepmg 195.000 
US troops in Central and 30 000 in Southern Europe regardless of 
what the Soviet Umon does, and European bases. 
d: announced plans to expand NATO, admitting unified Germany; 
e: put forward asymmetric, Wesトcenteredconcepts for Europe 
百 The(West) European Superpo"er 
At the same time the superpower character of the 12 member (so 
far) European Community /Umon is becoming clearer. comprising"'・ 
a: economic integratwn, with an mner market from 1993; 
b political integration from around 1995/96; 
c: increasing argumentation for military integratwn, possibly based on 
the 9 member (out of the 12) West European Union; 
d: a very high level of cultural integration based on shared history, 
Christianity/Enlightenment and (mamly) similar languages; 
e: a sense of global間 isswnbased on the sunny side of European 
culture and the dark colonial experience shared by 9 EC members; 
!: potentially continental size and a 9 d1g1t population base, 
g: a deep water navy with nuclear submarines, French and British 
nuclear forces independent of NA TO, missiles, space satellites; 
h: an mner French-German friendship axis combining French political 
v1s1on since 1950 with solid German economic backing. 
Of course there are problems in the EC/ EU-Germany US NATO 
quadrangle, and some of them may have security implications. Thus, 
wil the EC always remain pregnant with a baby the size of Germany, 
and if not, will the delivery be painless? Can Germany forever be ”con 
tamed” m NATO, with foreign troops stationed in what may look 
increasingly hke occupal!on, even by six countries, rather than 
protection, now that the threat is gone? Will the US involve the other 
NATO members m new confrontations, for instance in North Afnca or 
in the Middle East as the classical East-West conflict dissolves further, 
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and how wil members and others react? 
V Prognosis: From Bloc Confrontation to Hegemony 
The major secunty problems both in and of Europe wil from now on 
be variations over the general theme of Western hegemony. One 
hypothesis might view the Yalta and the Malta system as similar only 
that the former divided Europe and the latter the whole world in 
"spheres of interest”. The US wil exercise hegemony in the Western 
Hemisphere and the Middle East; the EC m the ACP system m 
general and in Africa in particular; Japan in East and Southeast Asia 
and the Soviet Union over itself, like India and China Thus, the US 
may mvolve EC m the Middle East and the EC the US in Africa; both 
of them invoking the fight agamst terrorism and drug control as major 
motives. But an unprovoked threat to the secunty of Europe from 
Afnca or the Middle East is hardly on the horizon. 
The consequences for the security in Europe of the gradient from 
the Western peak to the Eastern trough wil be considerable. 
Western military superiority derives from a number of factors: an 
intact alliance, the possible transfer of Eastern Germany from WTO to 
NATO, three nuclear powers in the West as against one in the East, a 
Western superpower whose territory fals outside the purview of the 
CFE whereas Soviet territory does not, and US sea based missiles and 
Star Wars strategic superiority. 
Western political superiority derives from the five strong mtergov 
ernmental organizations: NATO in Brussels, WEU in Paris, EC m 
Brussels, OECD in Pans and Council of Europe m Strasbourg. 
Western cultural superiority derives from free world dynamics as 
opposed to the backwaters of stalinist cultural repression. 
VI Cassandra’s Scenario 
But the basic threat to security derives from Western economic 
superiority. lmagme the economic landscape of Eastern Europe/Soviet 
Umon, devastated by stahmst economics, mvaded economically by 
heavy EC economic investment up to the Urals, with Japan also 
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investmg up to the Urals, from the East. With the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange established in Volgograd and German and Japanese 
businessmen meeting in the Urals, World War I is over. Popular, 
mcludmg vulgar, Western culture with commercials and commercialism, 
junk food, junk news and iunk entertamment wil replace stalinist 
scarcity and austerity. What happens then? Usmg general knowledge of 
hegemomcal, umpolar systems with economic superiority as the leading 
factor, for instance from the Western hemisphere or from the European 
(very recent) colonial past, this is one image, painting the future 
Cassandra dark: 
a: there is heavy economic growth in Eastern Europe/ Soviet Umon 
around capital , technology-and management intensive growth 
poles; and increases in unemployment, even misery, and property 
cn釘1e,
b: consumerism as cultural invasion collides increasingly with old 
European values, already eroded m the West, with loss of identity, 
more alcohol/drug consumption, violent crimes and suicide/homicide; 
c: there is tristesse, even nostalgia for the socialist security and cultural 
identity of the past, even if job, food and shelter were madequate 
and the idenl!ty and cultural creativity was a consequence of stalinist 
oppression and may disappear with it; 
d: as this unrest cannot be articulated in marxist socialist terms 
although that discourse may be used as blackmaiトー” Ifyou don’t 
invest more we’1 become communists again” ideological expres・ 
swns wil probably take such nght wing ・forms as nationalism, 
religious fundamentalism, even fascism, with governmental rule by 
decree; 
e: this formula suits those who benefit from periphery capitalism while 
also suppressing those who think they wdl not benefit; 
f: class conflicts wil be hitched onto the rich texture of ethnic 
conflicts, in post-war Eastern Europe hidden by pax sovietica; 
g: violent expressions, such as terrorism, destruction of foreign 
enterprises, kidnappmg of foreign nationals etc. wil be more than 
local police are able or willing to handle; 
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h: Western Europe then responds with European Peace keeping Forces 
(EPKF) to protect mvestment abroad, and European Rapid 
Deployment Forces (ERDF) to come to the rescue of its own 
nationals. Both wil be by invitation of Eastern governments totally 
dependent on investment from the West, and wil be referred to as 
self defense; 
i: a complication might be most favored economic treatment to former 
German terntones in Poland and RSFSR, leading to de facto 
economic mtegration and demands for poltttcal Anschluss; 
j: US mterests may separate from EC interests, hke in Latin America, 
making US troops stationed in Germany and Japan look irrelevant or 
like occupation forces checkmg economic competitors; 
k: German mterests may also separate from EC interests in general, 
bemg more East European, less generally ACP-oriented; 
l: new alliances may take shape, and major violence may occur. 
四 Polyanna’sScenario 
There is no disagreement with the maior and rather obvious premise 
that a transformation is takmg place from bipolar to unipolar, and from 
military to economic, confrontation. Nevertheless, there are alternatives 
with more balance in Europe and more pan European cooperatton, in a 
scenano pamtmg the future Polyanna light 
a: economically the weaker countnes m Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union might produce as much as possible locally and nationally, 
cooperating among themselves, and trade more with the 33 mtlhon 
EFTA countries'" m Western Europe, small but EC's largest trade 
partner, wtth sohd welfare state traditions; 
b: culturally the Eastern countnes may fmd it to thetr advantage to 
preserve and develop further Central/ East European culture while 
bemg open to the rest of the world and not only the West; 
c: politically the Eastern countries might in al contexts insist on pan 
European dects1on making, usmg fuly the Conference for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) with the US and Canada (the 
Cold War System) to ensure that any fait accompli to maior tssues 
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hke German umficatton is not forced upon the Europeans; 
d: militarily the Eastern countries may not only insist on the transfor 
mal!on of NA TO and the WTO to polit1cal alliances or as a 
minimum on the transformal!on from offensive to defensive 
doctrines and postures, but also on the creation of a UN Security 
Commiss10n for Europe開， SCE,like the UN Economic Commission 
for Europe, as a permanent CSCE secretariat to monitor agreements 
and process complaints, possibly also with peacekeeping capacity 
四 AFuture between Cassandra and Polyanna? 
The near future wil probably be closer to the Cassandra than the 
Polyanna scenarios. If so an opportunity is being lost Europe has rarely 
been so plastic as fal 1989. The Western leadership quickly understood 
this and shaped sk1llfully the raw material, a plastic Europe, to their 
advantage They had been the spectators, taken entirely by surprise 
（”nobody could have predicted this”）. They could not have predicted 
anything so far outside their discourse as Europe was liberated from 
the scourges of stalinism/nuclearism essent阻alyby an unlikely alliance例
。fthe d1ss1dent movement in the East, the peace movement in the 
West, and Gorbachev向
Usmg the confederation as the most effective general peace formula 
we know, combining cooperation w1thm with separatrnn of parliaments, 
governments and financ阻I/foreign/ military policy so as not to be 
provocal!ve, even aggressive without, five ideas can be proposed for 
Europe"', some of them stil feasible: 
a: a German confederat10n of BRD, DDR. and Berlin何lest), as 
Staatenbund, not Bundesstaat, with neither Mauer nor Zaun, and 
free flow of ideas, persons, and production factors and products; 
b: keeping the European Community as a confederation, not movmg 
further toward financial/foreign pol町＇／mil血ryu山n
c creating a Central and East European Confederation; 
d: transforming the Soviet Umon from tsanst/ stalimst empire to a 
Soviet Confederat阻止 with the present republics as members; 
e: creating a Common European Home essentially as a confederatrnn, 
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with the CSCE as the supreme organ and the SCE as one 
secretariat. 
IX Cold War Residues 
There are stil residues to be dealt with, energetically and boldly 
“cleanmg up the mess”left behind by the irrationality of the arms race 
of recent decades. In so doing it might be worth reflecting on one 
major point: neither the western, nor the eastern side is in possesston 
of the proof that the other stde ever seriously prepared an unprovoked 
attack. The Soviet Union had plans for massive invasions westward and 
the West for massive bombardment, mcluding nuclear, eastward in case 
of an attack. But that ts no proof of aggressive intent, only proof of 
offensive postures and doctrines and their provocative 1mphcations'" 
Consequently: 
a: under CSCE or UN auspices an international conference should be 
organized on military doctrines, requesting al CSCE countnes to state 
explicitly their mihtary doctrines with a view to moving the whole 
continent toward non-provocative doctrines and postures; 
b: the CFE process of disarming offensive weapons systems thereby 
transarming Europe toward conventional defensive defense - should 
be accelerated, focussing particularly on offensive armed vehicles, 
c: the US position notwithstanding, time tables should be established 
for the removal of al foreign bases, weapons systems (particularly for 
mass destruction) and armed forces from Europe; 
d: the Swiss referendum 26 November 1989 with 35.6% voting in favor 
of the abolition of the Swiss Army by the year 2000 could be 
repeated in other countries; opening for a serious debate about what 
a future Europe without national armies might look hke. 
X Conclusions 
For a person used to the Cold War, Europe today is hard to 
recognize. This also has implications for the neutral/ non aligned 
countries. With the bipolar confrontation gone neutrality in the sense of 
nonalignment makes no sense: who can be nonaligned when there is no 
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maior confhct with clear confhct parties to be ahgned with? But 
neutrality as a general foreign policy doctrine of non participation in 
military conflict is equally meaningful m a umpolar configuration. The 
pledge is made credible through defensive defense and would be very 
meaningful for unified Germany. 
The ambiguity of unified Germany in NATO wil NATO contain 
German revanch田t/expansiomst forces or wil these forces be able to 
persuade NATO to push eastward - wil rem剖nas long as NATO is a 
m1htary alliance. A transformation of NATO to a political alhance would 
remove that objection to unified Germany in NATO 
Stationmg of Soviet troops m the eastern part of unified Germany as 
a quzd pro quo for US troops m the western part wil only preserve 
the status quo and serve to legitimize overstaymg US troops Hopefully 
the Soviet Umon wdl not play that game. 
But even German unification is overshadowed by the emergence of 
the (West) European Union as a superpower. This is as deplorable as it 
was predictable from the early 1950s onwards. The EC relation to the 
inner periphery of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and to the 
outer ACP penphery is loaded with tensions. But that 1s where the 
major security problem of Europe is located now In a world that 
badly needs fewer, not more superpo山ers
And this is where the multipolar context of the new version of the 
“old continent" Europe, that has brought so much disaster and so much 
blessing to the rest of the world, enters. Which are the other poles? 
United States no doubt, and whatever wil remain of the Soviet Union 
(minus the Baltic republics, Moldavia, Georgia and Azerbaijan? but 
possibly in a confederation), if for no other reasons because of the land 
mass and the formidable weaponry. Then there are China and India 
because of land mass and population, and Japan because of the 
economy. It may be argued that the United States, the European Union 
and Japan have global reach whereas the Soviet Umon, China and India 
are regional superpowers, formidable relative to their regional 
neighbors, but not global - alone. 
US, EU, SU; China, Japan, India three North/white/European 
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Amenc印刷 threeSouth/ non white/ Asianー ina context of the 
Amencas south of Rio Grande with the Caribbean, Afnca and the rest 
of Asia/Pacific How ts that gomg to shape up? A m山 ipolar町stemis 
very difficult to mamtain in a stable eqmhbrium. The tendency wdl be 
for the system to become bipolar after some time. So, which of the 
ways of dividin呂 田xsuperpowers into two or three camps is more 
hkely, and what are the 1mphcations for the rest of the world? Here are 
some possible scenarios: 
a: Europe/ North America against Asia, a disastrous combmation, 
Idled with racism, but not enttrely unhkely. A Japan China-Korean 
Common Market ts potent凶lystronger than US/EU; incidentally. 
b: Europe/ Japan against the rest; with Japan and Germany as the 
leadmg countries, an economic contmuation of World War I. 
c: Europe/Soviet Union, Cl山 a/Japan and the US; leaving out the 
US and India who would not find each other. The two big blocs 
would center on EU/ Germany and Japan, the US would be 
marginali田 das the Argentma of 21st century, clinging to military/ 
political power over the Western Hemisphere The big blocs might 
then easily add one superpower each, meaning that c becomes a 
above. 
d:Soviet Union田 abroker between US/EU and China/Japan. This 
is an mteresting possibility for the Soviet Union, making constructive 
use of the basic geographical fact of being located in two continents 
at the same time. The SU could maintain good relations to the EU 
and to China, the geographical neighbors with continental borders in 
common, and at the same ttme cultivate good relations to the US 
and Japan, and contmue the good relations to India Investments and 
trade could be invited from al four and the Soviet Union could 
be叩 mesome kind of cross roads - provided commumcation/ 
transportation improves. A certam mternal cohesiveness, at least at 
the level of confederation would be needed. The pattern, incidentally, 
would also be the only one mentrnned that would include India, 
otherwise left out. 
e: Europe/Soviet Umon/Chma against US/Japan. A look at the map 
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is enough to mform us that this rs not far-fetched: the ”Eurasian 
landmass”against the Pacrfrc Basin. But right now sceptrcism 
against the Soviet Umon both in Europe and in Chma, and the 
tension between the US and Japan, would argue against this 
pattern. 
And the Third World? Left to rts own devices Which might be the 
best outcome, forcmg development through self-reliance 
Notes 
(I) The communique from the Meeting of the WEU Minislers of Fmeign Affairs and 
Defense, Den Haag 26-27 Oclober 1987 mentions (Preamble, 2) the delermmalion 
to create the European Unmn and !he conv1chon !hat thrn wil be incomplete sn 
Jong as the mtegratmn does not also mciude secunly and defense 
(2) See Johan Gallung, The European Community A Superpower in the Making, 
London Allen&Unwm, 1973 for an early dJScusSJon of thJS theme, and !he follow 
up in Emope in the Making, New York/ London: Taylor & Francis, I田9,
chapter 2，”E泊ropethe contradiction fre: From communily to superpowerぺ
pp. 22 36. 
(3) Nobody would deny the overpnwermg relevance of the EC countries for the neo-
liberal regimes in Eastern Europe. But a deal with EFTA would create a 
commumty of close to 150 mdhon persons with the Soviet Unmn 100 milhon 
more than even the EC with the eastern part of Germany. A negotiation between 
two equals might bring about a better European Economic Space, EES. But the 
EC in an early stage had Monnet and Schuman: the Soviet Union had 
Gorbachev. Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have what EFTA does not 
have, chansmat1c leader<一 butthey have other problems' 
(4) See J. Galtung, and S. Lndgaard., eds., Cooperation m Europe, Oslo: Norwegian 
Universities Press, 1970, chapter on security commi8'ions. The research was done 
for the Council of Europe 1967. 
(5) They bnth came into being as mass movements around 1980, the dissident 
movement above al in Czechosl。vakiaand Poland and the peace movement 
above al in the Netherlands and Western Germany. Typically the dissident 
movement "w the peace movement as willmg to compromJSe with the 
commumst regimes If they shnwed moderatmn m the arms race, and the peace 
movement saw the dJSSJdent movement as wilhng to dnve the world closer to 
war if that would serve the end of stalinism. There was some truth to both 
perceptm"', but frequent meetmgs between the two made the d』s'1dentsmore 
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peace ociontod and the poacenik• moce human dghl• odentod thrnugh the fi"t 
half of the 1980' 
(6) See Johan Galtung，”Eumpe Fall 1989' What happened, and why?", Honolulu, 
spnng 1990, wntten foe many pubhcations 
(7) Thece ace many pmposals of this and s1milac kmds wculatmg m Eurnpe now 
Thus, Pelee Glotz m his Ges町 nt<Umpasummanzes his pmposals m six theses. Jn 
the ficst he undedin" the significance of CSCE, in the second he acgues foe the 
continuation of the secudty system of East Centrnl Eurnpe, in the thicd that the 
EC has to mtegmte foceign and militacy policy to be able to incocpornte states in 
East Centml Eurnpe, in the foucth that EFT A should coopernte with East 
Centrnl Eurnpe and then thece should be an association agceement between the 
EC and EFTA, in the fifth he acgues in favoc of pan-Eurnpean institutions foe 
d1s"mament, env1rnnment, cultuce and m the sixth foe moce sub rngional 
conperntion in Nocthern, Cetrnl, Western and Southeastern Eurnpe; and then al 
kmds of cooperntion among the pacts 
Then thece is the Vision foe Eurnpe by Michael Mectes and Nocbect ). Pcil 
(Frnnkfurt" Allgemeine Zdtung, 14 July 1989) which acgue' in favoc of a fouc-
speed Eumpe; 
1. A United States of Eurnpe, a Eurnpean Union, ocganized as a Bundes,,aat, 
with the ongmal six EC membecs, but open foe moce, 
2. A Emopean Community like now, possibly with Austcia and Nocway, ocganized 
as a Staatenbund, 
3. An Association of Eumpean States, o<ganized moce like EFTA, including the 
othec Nocdic countcies and the new democcacies in East Centml E<ffope and the 
Baltic states, 
4. The c。mmonEurnpean Home, the CSCE with the Soviet Union, USA and 
Canadよa田umingthe secudty functions of the pcesent militacy alliances. 
Thece ace al'o cepocts about a Soviet plan (lntemational Herald Tribune, 26 
Macch 1990) based on cegionalization of Eurnpe in a Nmdic Co mcil (intecestingly 
with the Baltic states), a West Eurnpean Cnnfedecation and a Centrnl Em。pe
Grnup with Italy, Austna and Hungacy, and Czechoslovak.a and Yugo,lav1a 
Jn his speech to the US Congcess Vaclav Havel, Pcesident of Czechoslovakia, 
did not pcmnt any acch1tectme foe Eurnpe b巴•yond welcommg mullipolanty, 
w1shmg th't Eumpe could manage hec own secunty prnblems, welcommg the 
CSCE summ<l confecence and hopmg fo< Eurnpeamzation of strnctmes that “ace 
fo<mally Emopean but de facto West Eurnpean”（Congrmional Records, 21 
Febrnacy 199n). 
Thece wil be many mme such ideas. To secve peace thcee points to keep in 
mmd would be (a) al ovec balance m levels of economic pnwec and pnhtical 
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mtegmtion, (b) lorn], natwnal, regiooal and pan Europe•n ,o]utwn• ace more 
peace-productive than >mbalanced structures and (c) let many flowern bloom, 
combme many formulas for peace-bmldmg, also m a messy, drnorderly pattern 
a pomt strongly made by Peter Gl。t,.An example would be al confederatwns 
mentioned in the paper, at the some time. Incidentally, except for the Soviet 
Confederation the rnader wdl fmd these confederatwns developed m Europe m 
the Making, pa<ticularly in the Introduction and in the Conclusio 1. 
(8) Another, also •mportant, consequence would be that nuclear weapons d>d not 
deter a maior war in Europe there was nothmg to deter And they certamly did 
not deter Sov>et aggression on Eastern Europe, particularly not Hungary 1956 and 
m c,echoslovakm 1968, but then they were not mtended to do so e>ther See 
Galtung, op. cit., chapter 4“The Structure of a Myth: 'Nuclear detwence has 
preserved peace in Europe for 40 years’”， pp. 49-59. 
Thrn does not mean that we are approach>ng the end of the era, m>t>ated 
w>th bactenolog>cal and chem<eal warfare, of weapons of mass destruct.on 
Nuclear weapons may be faced out as >mpractical, because they destroy too 
much, including the sender (secondary radmactiv>ty): m>SS>les may be rule<! out as 
being too slow. But next in line would be the US Star Wars generation of 
weapons w>th lam beams, bemg very pree>se and movmg at the speed of hght 
One possible Soviet cesponse was given by Valentin Falin：”If you develop 
something in space, we could develop something on Earth - We'll take 
asymmetncal means w>th new scientihc pnnciples avadable to us Genetic 
engineedng could be a hypothetical example. Things can be done for which 
ne>ther side could fmd defenses m countermeasures, w>th very danger。usresults” 
(as quoted by Flora Lewrn，“As d time had lost >ts neutrahty”， lnternatwnal 
H"ald Tribune, 12 13 December 1987). Thus, most important to watch is 
probably not what " already on the negotiatmn table but what " bemg 
developed, using d』sarmamentnegotmtmns to conceal the R&D on new”sys 
terns 
When >t comes to drnarmament回 generala bas<e factor " the pmme 
generated on the economy of the two supe<powers by releasmg hundred thousand 
soldiers on the labor market, in the Soviet case also on the housing market. As 
reported m Frankfurter Allgememe (quoted by World Prm Reu>ew, January 
1990）：”Until now, 60 percent of the $300 bilion U.S. defense budget has gone 
mto defendmg Western Europe For every mdhon dollars that the Pentagon cuts 
from >ts arms budget, alm。st30,000 iobs wdl be lost by mdustry” 
The basic CFE guideline would be transarmament to defensive defense, 
hopmg that thrn time Europe W>l succeed better than under the League of 
Natmns, see Hollms, Powers and Summer, The Conquest of War, B°'lder: 
Acm• Cnntrnl and o;,.cmament 15 
We•tv;ew Pcm, 1989, pp. 64 68. Al•o •ee my own Thece Me  Alternative., 
NoWngham: Spoke•man, 1983, chaptec 5.2 on tca"'acmament ;nclud;ng 
nonm1htacy defe"'e 
Te,,1many Jar the Pali"cal Affairs Committee, Eumpean Parliament Brussels 
20ル1arch1990 
